How should applied psychologists conceptualise an autism spectrum disorder diagnosis and its predictive validity? by Hassall, R.
This is an author produced version of How should applied psychologists conceptualise an 
autism spectrum disorder diagnosis and its predictive validity?.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/122579/
Article:
Hassall, R. (2017) How should applied psychologists conceptualise an autism spectrum 
disorder diagnosis and its predictive validity? Educational and Child Psychology, 34 (4). 
ISSN 0267-1611 
This is a pre-publication version of the following article: Hassall, R., (2017) How should 
applied psychologists conceptualise an autism spectrum disorder diagnosis and its 
predictive validity?, Educational and Child Psychology, 34 (4) 
promoting access to
White Rose research papers
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
  Richard Hassall.  16.10.17 
 
 1 
Pre-publication draft due to be published in Educational & Child Psychology, 2017, 
34(4). 
 
How Should Applied Psychologists Conceptualise an Autism 
Spectrum Disorder Diagnosis and its Predictive Validity? 
 
 
Abstract 
Aim: Many educational and clinical psychologists are involved in autism diagnosis 
services, yet there is no clarity about the nature of the disorder underlying what they 
believe they are diagnosing. This paper therefore aims to examine some typical 
assumptions about the implications of an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) diagnosis. 
Rationale: This conceptual review questions whether ASD represents a distinct kind 
of disorder, in view of the substantial changes in definitions of autism over the past 50 
years. This is addressed from the perspective of philosophy of science by considering 
whether ASD constitutes a natural kind with explanatory and predictive value. 
Findings: Research studies have failed to identify any distinct cognitive abnormality 
which uniquely characterises autism. There are no interventions specifically for 
people with an ASD diagnosis which, when available, are not also effective for those 
with other conditions. Outcomes for those with the diagnosis may be more varied than 
hitherto supposed and may depend on other variables apart from the diagnosis itself. 
Limitations: It is impossible to cover all relevant research for a fully comprehensive 
overview of the field in a paper of this length. However, most of the research and 
review papers cited are of recent date. 
Conclusions: It is difficult to see ASD as a distinct natural kind of psychological 
disorder. The outlook for those diagnosed is often hard to predict. Psychologists 
therefore need to be cautious about the manner in which they communicate diagnoses 
to avoid overly gloomy prognostications. 
Key words: Autism, ASD, Diagnosis, Natural kinds, Validity 
 
Working under pressure in busy autism diagnosis services, professionals such as 
educational and clinical psychologists may have little time to reflect on the nature of 
the process in which they are involved. Specifically, they may fail to reflect on the 
enormous power they exercise over the children and young people they diagnose. The 
nature of this power is evident in the consequences for access to additional support 
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services reserved for those children with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
diagnosis. Professional power is also evident in the labelling effects of a diagnosis: it 
has a long term impact on the way in which those concerned are perceived by others 
and indeed on their own narratives about themselves. This is apparent also in its 
capacity to generate strong reactions of shock, confusion and grief in parents when 
they are informed by professionals oIWKHLUFKLOG¶VGLDJQRVLV± see Nadesan (2005) 
and Runswick-Cole (2016) for accounts of their own personal reactions on receiving 
such news. 
This might seem an unremarkable situation if there were a clear understanding 
about the nature of the disorder being identified. However, despite decades of 
research, no such stable understanding about the nature of autism has yet been 
reached. Indeed such consensus as does exist centres around the heterogeneity of 
autistic features and symptoms at the genetic, neurological, and cognitive levels (e.g. 
Brunsdon & Happé, 2014; Constantino & Charman, 2016; Rutter, 2013). Despite this 
state of affairs, there is a temptation for applied psychologists and other professionals 
to take for granted the validity of the condition they believe they are identifying when 
they diagnose a child with autism. They frequently appear to be guided by the 
assumption that autism represents some distinct kind of disorder characterised by an 
underlying abnormality which has predictive validity and is shared by all those with 
the diagnosis, despite the large overt variability in symptoms displayed by those 
affected. In other words, the assumption appears to be that autism is a natural kind of 
psychological disorder, something more than just a label, which can be confidently 
identified through the use of current diagnostic procedures. 
In this conceptual review, I argue that such an assumption can reasonably be 
questioned. I first briefly review recent changes in diagnostic criteria for autism, now 
categorised as autism spectrum disorder in DSM-5 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Such changes may be expected to cast doubt on whether autism is 
a sufficiently stable concept to reflect a natural kind of disorder. I then discuss how 
natural kinds are typically understood by philosophers as having explanatory and 
predictive importance in science. In view of the fact that autism is treated in 
diagnostic manuals as a disorder of some kind, however broadly understood, I discuss 
how natural kinds can be understood in medical science. Applying these 
considerations to the case of autism, I argue that it fails to constitute a natural kind of 
medical or psychological disorder, and that this is equally the case for the latest 
  Richard Hassall.  16.10.17 
 
 3 
category of ASD in DSM-5. Neither the concept of autism nor that of ASD provide 
any explanatory account of the particular configuration of symptoms in any given 
individual, they give little indication of appropriate therapeutic interventions beyond 
what can be derived from a personalised formulation, and the outcome for those with 
the diagnosis is less deterministic than has hitherto been supposed. I conclude by 
suggesting that the indeterminacy concerning an ASD diagnosis needs to be reflected 
in the manner in which it is communicated to families. 
 
Changes in diagnostic criteria 
One of the more remarkable features of autism concerns the significant shifts in its 
conceptualisation and diagnostic criteria VLQFH.DQQHU¶V(1943) paper first described 
the condition. The most recent change occurred in 2013 when DSM-5 replaced DSM-
IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). In the latter, autistic disorder was 
classified under the broader heading of pervasive developmental disorders (PDD) and 
LGHQWLILHGZLWKWKH³WULDGRILPSDLUPHQWV´i.e. (1) impairments in social interaction, 
(2) impairments in language and communication, and (3) restricted or repetitive 
behaviours and interests (RRBIs). In DSM-5 this has been replaced by the new 
FDWHJRU\RI³DXWLVPVSHFWUXPGLVRUGHU´$6'ZKLFKLVQRZVSHFLILHGby two types 
of impairment: (1) persistent deficits in social communication and interaction, and (2) 
RRBIs (as in DSM-IV). This in effect amounts to the current definition of ASD, albeit 
in brief form. In addition, DSM-5 has introducHGDQHZFDWHJRU\RI³VRFLDO-
communication disorder´ (SCD). The single criterion for this is essentially the same 
as the first criterion for ASD ± i.e. a persistent deficit in social cognition and 
interaction skills. Someone who displays such a deficit without any RRBIs would be 
diagnosed with SCD rather than ASD. 
A significant change in DSM-5 has been the exclusion of Asperger syndrome. 
The criteria in DSM-IV failed to distinguish it sufficiently clearly from autistic 
disorder and particularly from high-functioning autism (Happé , 2011). What has 
persisted KRZHYHULVWKHFRQFHSWRIDQ³DXWLVPVSHFWUXP´and this concept, rather 
WKDQ³DXWLVP´simpliciter, now constitutes the named disorder in DSM-5. 
Nevertheless, these terms are frequently used interchangeably ± to ³have autism´ is to 
³be on the autism spectrum´.  
These changes are the latest in a series of discontinuities in the way in which 
autism has been conceptualised over the past 70 years, which tend to be obscured by 
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the predominant belief in autism as an essentially stable entity (Verhoeff, 2013). 
These can be understood as occurring in three broad phases according to Verhoeff. 
The first of these, initiated by Kanner in 1943, treated autism as a disorder 
characterised by extreme aloneness and insistence on sameness. 7KHWHUP³DXWLVP´
was coined in the early 1900s by the Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler to describe one 
of the primary symptoms of schizophrenia (Kanner, 1973). Kanner adopted this term, 
conceiving of autism as a form of childhood schizophrenia of early onset. In this 
phase, it was regarded as a distinct, albeit rare, psychiatric condition falling within the 
remit of psychiatry. The second, beginning in the 1960s and influenced by 
increasingly sophisticated empirical investigations, conceptualised autism more in 
terms of cognitive and perceptual abnormalities than as an affective disorder. The 
third, beginning around 1980 and coinciding with the changes introduced by DSM-III 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1980), shifted the principal emphasis to 
abnormalities of social cognition and communication. The previous association with 
childhood schizophrenia was abandoned (Frith, 2003) and the notion of a spectrum of 
autistic disability introduced. Nevertheless, the assumption that a biomedical 
explanation for the condition would ultimately emerge has continued to underpin the 
conception of autism as a distinct diagnosable disorder. 
Rates of autism diagnosis began to increase rapidly as the boundaries of the 
diagnosis widened with the publication of DSM-III and subsequent revisions. 
Corresponding with this broadening of boundaries, there has been a dramatic increase 
in the prevalence of autism. Thus, Frith (2012) notes that the prevalence has risen 
from 0.04 to 1 per cent of the population over the past 50 years and one recent study 
puts the prevalence as high as 2.64 per cent (Kim et al., 2011). 
Taken together, these successive changes raise the question of whether the latest 
conceptualisation of ASD in DSM-5 will be any more stable than preceding ones in 
earlier editions of the DSM. 
 
Natural kinds in science 
Progress in science normally requires the identification of categories which represent 
the kinds of entities presumed to exist in the world. This is sometimes described as 
³FDUYLQJQDWXUHDWLWVMRLQWV´7RWKHH[WHQWWKDWVXFKcategories succeed in indicating 
explanations and grounding predictions, they can typically be understood as 
representing natural kinds (Bird, 1998). In normal circumstances, of course, scientists 
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do not discuss their theorising in the terminology of natural kinds. However, the value 
of such an analysis is that it can clarify the extent to which the central concepts in a 
scientific discipline are actually doing explanatory work (Khalidi, 2013). 
Paradigmatic examples of natural kinds include the chemical elements (e.g. 
hydrogen, gold) and biological species (e.g. tigers, ring-tailed lemurs). These are 
kinds which have some degree of stability and the power to ground scientific laws and 
reliable predictions. There is an extensive literature in philosophy of science detailing 
different accounts of natural kinds and their explanatory function. The simplest, 
µHVVHQWLDOLVW¶DFFRXQWHJ(OOLVKROGVWKDWQDWXUDONLQGVDUHGHILQHGE\DQ
essential property as a necessary and sufficient condition for membership of the kind 
± e.g. the atomic number of a chemical element is its essence and explains many of its 
causal properties. However, a more complex account is needed for those sciences, 
particularly biological and biomedical sciences, where it is generally not possible to 
identify a single defining essence present in all members of a kind. Biological species, 
for example, are the product of evolutionary processes which of necessity depend 
upon variation in the genetic and other features of species members. In order to 
accommodate such kinds, alternative accounts explain natural kinds as characterised 
by clusters of properties, not all of which need be present in any specific member, but 
which collectively delineate the kind. Typically such accounts emphasise that the 
clusters of properties in natural kinds are linked by causal mechanisms which account 
for the role of the kind in scientific explanations (e.g. Boyd, 1991, 1999; Khalidi, 
2013). What these accounts emphasise is that natural kinds should have explanatory 
and predictive value in science and reflect the causal structure of the world. Khalidi 
(2013) develops this further by demonstrating how natural kinds have causal effects 
in a large range of sciences, including medical and psychiatric science. 
Several philosophers have described how medical diseases can be seen as 
natural kinds in virtue of their explanatory and predictive function. For example, 
Lange (2007) explains this as follows: 
«a diagnosis is intended to explain WKHSDWLHQW¶VVLJQVDQGV\PSWRPV
Therefore, a diseaVHFDWHJRU\PXVWKDYHµYDOLGLW\¶«which means that the 
disease must be a natural kind rather than an arbitrary category (2007, p.266, 
italics in original). 
Lange illustrates this using the example of phenylketonuria (PKU), a genetic disease 
characterised by a deficiency in a specific enzyme necessary for metabolizing 
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phenylalanine (an amino acid). The symptoms of PKU are explained by the clustering 
of properties represented by the enzyme deficiency and the presence of these 
properties allows for reliable predictions about the appropriate dietary restrictions 
needed to avoid lifelong disabilities in the child concerned. Other examples of natural 
disease kinds have been described in the literature, including Graves disease 
(Dragulinescu, 2010) and rheumatoid arthritis (Williams, 2011). In both these cases, 
the symptoms are linked within complex causal networks which indicate the aetiology 
of the disease and enable predictions about its course. 
What such examples demonstrate is that, despite the fact that diseases do not 
necessarily have a unique defining essence, they can be understood as causally linked 
clusters of symptoms produced by distinct aetiological processes. Therefore, if autism 
does represent a natural kind of disorder, we might expect it to constitute a natural 
kind on a similar basis, given the heterogeneity of its presenting symptoms. That is, 
we would expect there to be some set of causal relationships linking its different 
features and the concept itself would have significant explanatory and predictive 
value. 
 
Is autism a natural kind? 
Whilst one might argue that autism does not constitute a medical disease as generally 
understood, it is nevertheless seen as a disorder of some kind, something which can 
only be diagnosed by a professionally constituted child development team or mental 
health service. Indeed, it is this particular conception of diagnosis, without which 
autism cannot be identified in an individual, which is inextricably associated with 
medical and healthcare practice in general (Rosenberg, 2002). Moreover, the 
continuing search for genetic and neurological causes of the condition shows that a 
biological account is still being sought. This seems to be motivated by the enduring 
belief that autism constitutes a neuropsychological natural kind, an objective entity 
that will eventually be identified following further biomedical investigations 
(Verhoeff, 2012). Typically in medical science, diagnoses are expected to point to a 
FDXVDOH[SODQDWLRQRIWKHSDWLHQW¶VV\PSWRPVZKHQcontextualised by a broader 
theoretical framework which accounts for the functions of the relevant causal 
mechanisms (Maung, 2017). However, no clarity about either a causal explanation or 
a general theoretical framework for autism has yet been attained. When the diagnosis 
fails to point to any such explanation and when its predictive value is limited, there 
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must be doubts about whether it represents a natural kind. I therefore discuss the 
prospects for a cognitive explanation of autism, before examining its predictive value 
for treatment interventions and longer-term outcomes. 
 
Possibility of a cognitive explanation 
A common view of autism is that it must be characterised by a distinctive cognitive 
abnormality or profile which is capable of explaining the very varied symptoms in 
different individuals (e.g. Frith, 2012). However, extensive research efforts have so 
far failed to reliably support any unifying cognitive account which encompasses 
everyone with the diagnosis and discriminates autistic from non-autistic individuals. 
Various theories have been proposed about an underlying psychological deficit 
which can account for the presenting symptoms of the condition. Such a unifying 
deficit, if found, might be associated with some kind of neurological abnormality 
which would explain the nature of the disorder and confirm its status as a natural 
kind. However, no theory so far advanced has been able to do this and several autism 
researchers are now asking whether any such explanation is even possible (e.g. Happé 
et al., 2006). Typically, the psychological theories put forward have tended to focus 
on hypothesised cognitive deficiencies in people with an autism diagnosis. These 
include a theory of mind deficit (an impaired ability to understand the mental states of 
others), weak central coherence (difficulty in integrating detailed information into 
larger meaningful wholes), and executive function deficit (an inability to plan and co-
ordinate actions to achieve intended goals). Although other psychological deficits 
have also been hypothesised, these three have generated the most interest for 
researchers. However, the large number of research studies which have investigated 
the association between these cognitive features and children with an autism diagnosis 
have failed to produce any consistent findings which might explain all the symptoms 
of autism. Instead, as Brunsdon and Happé (2014) discuss in a recent review of many 
studies in this area, the picture is one of a heterogeneous collection of different 
cognitive abnormalities, typically with low correlations amongst them and with 
differing consequences for behavioural abnormalities. 
This was demonstrated recently by a large population-based empirical study by 
Brunsdon et al. (2015). Recruiting adolescents with an ASD diagnosis from the UK 
Twins Early Development Study, the researchers studied 181 young people with 
ASD, comparing them with 73 non-ASD co-twins and 160 normally developing 
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FRQWUROV$OORIWKH$6'JURXSZHUHGLDJQRVHGXVLQJ³JROG-VWDQGDUG´LQVWUXPHQWV
specifically the Autism Diagnostic Inventory-Revised and the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule. All participants were assessed on a range of tests designed to 
test for a theory of mind deficit (ToM), weak central coherence (CC), and executive 
function deficit (EF). All the tests used were taken from previous studies in which the 
test procedures had been established. 
The results of this study failed to demonstrate a clear and consistent pattern of 
cognitive deficits in the ASD sample. Only a small number demonstrated atypical 
cognitive performance in a single domain only (5% in ToM; 8% in CC; and 6% in 
EF). Others had atypicalities covering at least two domains, and the largest group 
(32%) showed atypicalities in all three domains. The authors argue that this can 
therefore be seen as a characteristic pattern in adolescents with ASD. Nevertheless, 
over two thirds of the sample did not show this pattern. Moreover, no deficit in any of 
the areas examined was found in 9 per cent of the ASD sample, but this is not 
discussed further by the authors. It was also noted that corresponding cognitive 
deficits occurred in the non-ASD co-twins and in the controls, though in smaller 
numbers. The combination of all three deficits (ToM + CC + EF) was found in 11 per 
cent of the non-ASD co-twins and in 6 per cent of the controls, despite their lacking a 
diagnosis. Only 14 per cent of the control group showed no measurable abnormality. 
Thus, when tested using operationalized measures of the three hypothesised cognitive 
deficits in one of the largest empirical studies yet conducted on this subject, no single 
unifying account of the cognitive underpinning of ASD symptoms emerged. At the 
same time similar deficits were observed in some of the co-twins and controls, despite 
their lack of an ASD diagnosis. 
It would seem therefore that studies of cognitive abnormalities in children with 
the diagnosis have not so far consistently supported a view of autism as a natural kind 
of disorder with a unifying cognitive explanation. Despite this, one might argue that 
autism still has significant predictive value. I therefore now discuss what predictive 
value might be attached to the concept of autism regarding its implications for 
treatment interventions and outcomes. 
 
Treatment interventions 
An ASD diagnosis, on its own, has no specific treatment implications distinct from 
those which might also be beneficial for other children. In the case of people with 
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autism and intellectual disabilities, there are no appropriate and effective interventions 
which are not equally effective for other people with intellectual disabilities (Bromley 
et al., 2012; Collins, 2016). For example, Collins describes several treatment 
packages, including the Treatment and Education of Autistic and Related 
Communication Handicapped Children programme (TEACCH), the Picture Exchange 
Communication System (PECS), and Applied Behaviour Analysis (ABA). All of 
these, however, are equally applicable to other people with intellectual disabilities. 
Moreover, ABA is based upon the use of functional analysis in planning interventions 
for challenging behaviour, and such interventions have no specific applicability to 
people with an ASD diagnosis. In such cases, Collins argues, the choice of 
intervention needs to EHEDVHGRQDGHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VVSHFLILF
abilities and needs, rather than on a diagnosis which appears to add nothing to the 
treatment plan. 
Howlin et al. (2009) seem to reflect this view in their review of early intensive 
behavioural interventions (EIBI) for young children, although they stop short of 
saying that the diagnosis is irrelevant to treatment planning. They conclude that such 
interventions work well for some, but not all, children with ASD, and attribute this 
variable response to the heterogeneity of cognitive and behavioural profiles covered 
by the diagnosis. They argue, therefore, that treatment needs to be based on the 
particular skills and deficit profile of the individual child. Similar conclusions are also 
reached by Reichow and Wolery (2009) in their synthesis of results of published EIBI 
studies. 
There is general agreement in the literature that EIBI programmes are helpful 
for children with ASD. Thus, Reichow (2012) in a survey of five meta-analyses of 
EIBI studies concluded that many children, though not all, showed improvement in 
IQ scores and, to a lesser extent, in adaptive behaviour following intervention. 
Typically however, these programmes are explicitly intended for young children with 
an ASD diagnosis and may not be offered to those with other forms of developmental 
disability. Therefore, it is not clear why EIBI programmes would not be equally 
effective for other children in need of developmental support if these were offered. 
Reflecting on the variability of response to treatment, Constantino and Charman 
(2016) comment that further discoveries about the aetiology of autism will likely lead 
to more personalised therapies, rather than standardised packages, in the future. It is 
unclear therefore what role the diagnosis itself, as opposed to individual behavioural 
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profiles, should play in treatment planning, other than to provide access to 
interventions which service commissioners and providers reserve for those with a 
diagnosis. 
 
Outcomes 
Autism has conventionally been regarded as a lifelong condition. Where individuals 
have been noted to improve their social functioning to the point that they no longer 
meet criteria for a diagnosis, this might typically be explained in terms of autistic 
V\PSWRPVEHFRPLQJ³PDVNHG´RUWKHLQGLYLGXDOKDYLQJJDLQHG³FRPSHQVDWRU\
VNLOOV´%\WKHXVHRIVXFKad hoc explanations, the view of autism as necessarily 
persisting for life could be maintained. Some support for this view comes from 
prospective studies of children and reveal significant stability of the diagnosis during 
childhood (Constantino & Charman, 2016) ± e.g. Lord et al. (2006) followed up 
children first diagnosed with autism at 2 years of age and found nearly all of these 
retained the diagnosis at 9 years. 
However, despite this stability of diagnosis in childhood, the longer-term 
prognostic implications of an autism diagnosis are rather unclear, with quite variable 
outcomes in adulthood for those diagnosed in childhood (Helt et al., 2008; Levy & 
Perry, 2011; Magiati et al., 2014). For example, Helt et al. (2008) in their review of 
outcome studies report that between 3% and 25% of children appear to lose their ASD 
diagnosis by adulthood. Whilst many of those children receiving the diagnosis can be 
expected to have difficulties with social skills and independent functioning in adult 
life, it is not clear how much these result from autism per se as distinct from other 
learning difficulties or intellectual disability. Of course, many people with an autism 
diagnosis do not have an intellectual disability, but in these cases the adult outcomes 
appear to be rather more variable, with some individuals able to live independent and 
productive lives and form intimate relationships. Reviews of research in this area tend 
to agree that early childhood IQ and language level are important predictors of 
outcome in higher functioning individuals (Helt et al., 2008; Levy & Perry, 2011; 
Magiati et al., 2014). One exception was a study by Helles et al. (2015) of 100 males 
with a diagnosis of Asperger syndrome for whom the outcome was not predicted by 
early IQ and language levels. Even so, there was an increase over time in the numbers 
no longer meeting criteria for a diagnosis. Psychiatric co-morbidity also appears to be 
a predictor of poorer long-term outcomes, as indicated by a recent study of 50 adult 
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males given a diagnosis of Asperger syndrome in childhood and followed up for 
periods of between 13 and 26 years (Gillberg et al., 2016). The results showed that 
those individuals who no longer met the criteria for the diagnosis in adulthood were 
also generally free of psychiatric symptoms. 
Generally, studies of long term outcome have been based on retrospective data 
regarding diagnoses made in childhood and may therefore depend upon initial 
assessments of uncertain and variable quality. However, a recently published 
prospective study, in which participants were assessed at ages 2, 3, and 19, again 
found that IQ scores in early childhood strongly predict later outcomes for children 
with an ASD diagnosis (Anderson et al., 2014). The authors also report that, by the 
age of 19, 9% of youths no longer had a clinical diagnosis and an additional 28%, 
whilst retaining features of ASD, nevertheless had much improved social and 
cognitive functioning. The outcome which was more reliably predicted at 19 years 
was intellectual disability, which was predicted by IQ scores at the earlier ages. 
Interpreting the findings from outcome studies, which have very variable 
methodologies and sample sizes, tends to be difficult. Furthermore, space limitations 
prevent a comprehensive review of all the literature in this area and consequently it 
might still be argued that an ASD diagnosis does have some predictive value. 
However, it seems clear from the recently published empirical and review papers 
cited here that distinguishing the predictive and discriminative validity of an ASD 
diagnosis from that of other conditions is difficult in many cases. Moreover, because 
the category of social-communication disorder (SCD) was only introduced in DSM-5, 
there are no long-term outcome studies comparing the predictive validity of this 
category with ASD, and indeed little is known in general about how SCD might differ 
in its effects from ASD (Swineford et al., 2014). However, it is not immediately clear 
why long-term outcomes for SCD should differ in any substantial way, given that the 
main difference between it and ASD is the absence of RRBI as a diagnostic criterion. 
To summarise, neither autism nor ASD appear to have much value as 
explanatory concepts in science. They do not explain the pattern of symptoms in 
individual cases, since the aetiology is unknown in most cases. In addition, the 
predictive and discriminative validity of ASD is very limited, since decisions about 
treatment and predictions about outcome are determined at least as much by other 
factors concerning the individual as by the diagnosis itself. Moreover, the fact that 
autism has undergone several significant changes in its conceptualisation since its 
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introduction by Kanner suggests that there is no reason to assume that its current 
description in DSM-5 will endure any longer than previous versions. Indeed, some 
autism researchers now expect the diagnosis of autism to undergo further evolution in 
response to new research (e.g. Constantino & Charman, 2016; Volkmar & 
McPartland, 2016). It is difficult therefore to see how autism or ASD can be 
conceptualised as a natural kind of psychological disorder. 
 
Conclusions 
The question considered here is whether autism is best understood as a qualitatively 
distinct categorical disorder or a broader cluster of social-cognitive abnormalities 
indicating only dimensional differences between people with the diagnosis and those 
without it. However, despite the recent DSM revisions, many autism researchers still 
appear to regard autism as something qualitatively distinct. Thus, Frith (2012) states 
that there is something different about the autistic mind, whilst acknowledging that 
the enormous amount of research over the last 30 years has failed to clarify what this 
might be. In contrast, Volkmar and McPartland now conjectureµIt might be time to 
move beyond diagnostic categories based at the syndrome level towards new, more 
descriptive, and broader conceptualisations of social-OHDUQLQJGLIIHUHQFHV¶ (2016, 
p.238). This suggests a far from settled position, not just about the nature and 
aetiology of the condition, but also about whether it constitutes a distinct disorder at 
all. 
The implications of this for psychologists involved in autism diagnosis services 
ought to be a matter of concern. It is difficult to avoid the assumption, when making a 
diagnostic judgment regarding whether the child concerned has autism, that there is 
some dLVWLQFWHQWLW\ZKLFKWKHFKLOGµKDV¶. However if, as argued above, autism is not 
a natural kind of psychological disorder, there must be real doubt that it corresponds 
with any kind of distinct entity. There can be no obvious reason to suppose that one 
individual with the diagnosis necessarily has the same kind of disorder as another 
with the same diagnosis, nor that the implications for intervention and longer term 
outlook are similar. In other words, one can reasonably ask whether a diagnosis of 
autism constitutes anything more than just a label. 
It may be very difficult for psychologists currently to escape the demands of 
contributing to autism diagnosis teams, because of irresistible pressures from service 
commissioners and the public. Nevertheless, this should not prevent them thinking 
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critically about what kind of entity they think they are diagnosing. Such a critical 
approach can influence the manner in which a diagnosis is communicated to children 
and parents, so as to avoid implying a gloomy prognosis that might accompany the 
label and instead aim for a nuanced analysis of the various other factors that are at 
least as important in influencing the longer-term outlook. As Constantino and 
Charman stateµ...over-prognostication carries with it the potential to do real harm, 
DQGSUHGLFWLRQVDERXWDQ\FKLOG¶VOLIHSURVSHFWVDUHEHVWNHSWRSHQZLWKDQ
appropriate emphasis on what is possible, and honest recognition of the limits of what 
LVNQRZQ¶ (2016, p.288). As noted, the experience for parents of receiving their 
FKLOG¶VGLDJQRVLVFDQEHYHU\WUDXPDWLF for them. The indeterminacy of an ASD 
diagnosis, regarding both the nature of the condition and its longer-term implications, 
ought therefore to be reflected in the manner in which the diagnosis is communicated 
to those concerned. 
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